

# On the complexity of semantic self-minimization

Adam Antonik and Michael Huth<sup>1,2,3</sup>

*Department of Computing  
Imperial College London  
London, United Kingdom*

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## Abstract

Partial Kripke structures model only parts of a state space and so enable aggressive abstraction of systems prior to verifying them with respect to a formula of temporal logic. This partiality of models means that verifications may reply with *true* (all refinements satisfy the formula under check), *false* (no refinement satisfies the formula under check) or *don't know*. Generalized model checking is the most precise verification for such models (all *don't know* answers imply that some refinements satisfy the formula, some don't), but computationally expensive. A compositional model-checking algorithm for partial Kripke structures is efficient, sound (all answers *true* and *false* are truthful), but may lose precision by answering *don't know* instead of a factual *true* or *false*. Recent work has shown that such a loss of precision does not occur for this compositional algorithm for most practically relevant patterns of temporal logic formulas. Formulas that never lose precision in this manner are called semantically self-minimizing. In this paper we provide a systematic study of the complexity of deciding whether a formula of propositional logic, propositional modal logic or the propositional modal mu-calculus is semantically self-minimizing.

*Keywords:* 3-valued model checking, partial state spaces, computational complexity, supervaluations.

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## 1 Introduction

Partial state spaces abstract an actual state space so that the resulting smaller state space allows for a feasible verification of such partial models. Such a check then has to be conservative: if the partial model satisfies the property under check, then *all* concrete systems consistent with that partial model should satisfy that property. This is required since we otherwise cannot be certain whether the actual state space satisfies this property, unless we check it on that actual system – the task we intend to avoid by using this abstraction technique in the first place – or have some other means of connecting properties of that abstraction to properties of the actual system.

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<sup>2</sup> Email: [aa1001@doc.ic.ac.uk](mailto:aa1001@doc.ic.ac.uk)

<sup>3</sup> Email: [M.Huth@doc.imperial.ac.uk](mailto:M.Huth@doc.imperial.ac.uk)

If  $\phi$  is the property we want to check, and  $\phi_M$  a property that characterizes all concrete systems that are consistent with the partial model  $M$ , we therefore want to check whether the property  $\phi_M \rightarrow \phi$ , a logical implication, holds in all concrete systems. Identifying the set of concrete systems with some class of models, and assuming that  $\phi_M$  and  $\phi$  belong to some logic that is interpretable over that class of models, we recognize this problem as a validity check of some logic. Since the size of  $\phi_M$  can be exponential in the size of  $M$ , this conceptually useful insight is less useful as the basis for efficient algorithms. Indeed, for the propositional modal mu-calculus [9] this would render a method for property verification in 2EXPTIME whereas the most precise conservative check of partial models is EXPTIME-complete [4].

A less precise but much cheaper and still conservative algorithm [3] – a 3-valued generalization of the familiar labelling algorithm – is available as an alternative that often can verify that all concrete models consistent with a partial one satisfy the property in question. Given that alternative, it is tempting to ask whether a property  $\phi$  is such that the cheaper algorithm always produces a correct result, regardless of the choice of partial model. In fact, it turns out [1] that this is the case for most practically relevant patterns of temporal logic specifications, as documented in [5] and at [patterns.projects.cis.ksu.edu](http://patterns.projects.cis.ksu.edu).

We can conceptualize this desirable feature of a property  $\phi$  – written in the propositional modal mu-calculus – as a computation of some normal form, followed by a “quantified” validity check. For such a  $\phi$  one can compute a formula  $\phi^p$  in the propositional modal mu-calculus such that running the cheap model-checking algorithm on  $\phi^p$  gives us the same result as running the expensive but most precise algorithm on  $\phi$ , for *all* partial models. Unfortunately,  $\phi^p$  may be exponentially larger than  $\phi$ . It turns out that deciding whether  $\phi$  has the aforementioned desirable feature is equivalent to asking whether the formulas

$$(\phi_M \rightarrow \phi) \leftrightarrow (\phi_M \rightarrow \phi^p)$$

are valid for all partial models  $M$ . Note that this appears to introduce an exponential blowup – from the size of  $M$  to the size of  $\phi_M$ , and from the size of  $\phi$  to the size of  $\phi^p$  – to the complexity of the validity problem for the given logic, and a possibly infinite quantification over such checks.

These insights suggest that one cannot decide efficiently whether properties have an efficient, compositional, *and* precise verification of partial models. The results in this paper corroborate this suspicion since we secure hardness results matching those for the validity problem of the respective logics. Unfortunately, our hardness results only come with an upper bound of an exponential gap. To add to this frustration, we cannot show any hardness results for deciding whether a formula *and* its negation do not lose precision in the sense discussed above.

From a practitioner’s point of view, the results of this paper may not matter much. For one, and as already mentioned, popular specification patterns were shown to either not lose precision or to have minor syntactic variants that don’t lose precision [1]. For another, temporal logic formulas used in practice tend to be rather short, and so an exponential or double exponential worst-case inflation in their size may sometimes be feasible. But we still think that the results reported here are of interest.

## Outline of paper.

In Section 2 we provide background on the verification of partial systems and on the concepts presented informally in the introduction. Our technical results are featured in Section 3. Related work is discussed in Section 4, and we conclude the paper in Section 5.

## 2 Background

In this paper we work with a finite set of atomic propositions,  $\mathbb{AP}$ . Atomic propositions are the observations one can make at states of partial models. At times, we will add one or more elements to  $\mathbb{AP}$ . These new atomic propositions will be used to expand partial models in order to prove desired hardness results.

We now define our models of partial state spaces. Since all temporal logics we study enjoy a finite-model property (and since we wish to verify abstractions that have finite state space), we will work with finite-state models throughout this paper.

**Definition 2.1** A partial Kripke structure [3]  $M$  is a tuple  $(S, R, L)$  where  $S$  is a finite set of states,  $R \subseteq S \times S$  is a state transition relation, and  $L: S \times \mathbb{AP} \rightarrow \{0, 1/2, 1\}$  a total (labeling) function such that  $L(s, q)$  specifies the truth value of atomic proposition  $q$  at state  $s$ .

We identify 0 with *false*, 1 with *true*, and 1/2 with *don't know* and make  $\{0, 1/2, 1\}$  into a poset with respect to the information ordering  $\leq_i$  [8,3] specified by  $1/2 \leq_i 0$  and  $1/2 \leq_i 1$ . Figure 1 shows two partial Kripke structures. We note that Kripke structures  $M = (S, R, L)$  are those partial Kripke structures that don't have 1/2 in the image of  $L$ . The meaning of a partial Kripke structure is that it describes a set of Kripke structures, those refinements that resolve all partiality of the state space. Such resolution means that labels  $L(s, q)$  have no longer value 1/2 but that the state space may well be larger or smaller. Refinement is defined as in [3].

**Definition 2.2** Let  $M = (S_M, R_M, L_M)$  and  $N = (S_N, R_N, L_N)$  be two partial Kripke structures.

- (i) A binary relation  $\preceq \subseteq S_M \times S_N$  is a refinement iff  $s \preceq t$  implies
  - (a)  $L(s, q) \leq_i L(t, q)$  for all  $q \in \mathbb{AP}$ ,
  - (b) for all  $(s, s') \in R_M$  there is  $(t, t') \in R_N$  with  $s' \preceq t'$ , and
  - (c) for all  $(t, t') \in R_N$  there is  $(s, s') \in R_M$  with  $s' \preceq t'$ .
- (ii) Given  $s \in S_M$  we call  $(M, s)$  a pointed model, which represents the partial Kripke structure  $M$  with initial state  $s$ .
- (iii) We say that  $(M, s)$  has  $(N, t)$  as refinement whenever there is a refinement  $\preceq$  as above such that  $s \preceq t$ .

**Example 2.3** Two partial Kripke structures are depicted in Figure 1. The one on the right is a pointed Kripke structure  $(N, t_1)$  and refines the pointed model  $(M, s_1)$  on the left and  $\preceq = \{(s_1, t_1), (s_2, t_2), (s_3, t_3), (s_4, t_3)\}$ .

We assume the usual satisfaction semantics between pointed Kripke structures and formulas of the propositional modal mu-calculus ( $\mathcal{MC}$ ), both of which we define




Fig. 1. Two partial Kripke structures  $M$  and  $N$  such that  $(N, t_1)$  refines  $(M, s_1)$  and  $N$  is a Kripke structure.

below. Refinement and this standard satisfaction notion let us define two judgments, one for generalized model checking [4] ( $\mathbb{S}\text{AT}$ , called GMC in loc. cit.), and one for its logical dual ( $\mathbb{V}\text{AL}$ ).

**Definition 2.4** Let  $(M, s)$  be a pointed model and  $\phi$  a sentence of the propositional modal mu-calculus. Then  $\mathbb{S}\text{AT}(M, s, \phi)$  holds iff there is a pointed Kripke structure that refines  $(M, s)$  and satisfies  $\phi$ . Dually,  $\mathbb{V}\text{AL}(M, s, \phi)$  holds iff all pointed Kripke structures that refine  $(M, s)$  satisfy  $\phi$ .

Whenever convenient, as in the next example, we make liberal use of CTL\* connectives as syntactic sugar expressible in  $\mathcal{MC}$ .

**Example 2.5** For the partial Kripke structure  $M$  in Figure 1, the judgments  $\mathbb{V}\text{AL}(M, s_1, \text{AF}(q \wedge \neg r))$  and  $\mathbb{V}\text{AL}(M, s_1, \text{AFEG} \neg r)$  hold. But we don't have  $\mathbb{V}\text{AL}(M, s_1, \text{AFAG} \neg r)$ , where the pointed Kripke structure  $(N, t_1)$  serves as a counterexample.

We hasten to point out that every partial Kripke structure has some pointed Kripke structure as refinement, so there are no vacuities [10] – here at the level of models – introduced into these two judgments  $\mathbb{S}\text{AT}(M, s, \phi)$  and  $\mathbb{V}\text{AL}(M, s, \phi)$ . When  $\phi$  ranges over the propositional modal mu-calculus, both judgments are EXPTIME-complete in the size of  $\phi$  and quadratic in the size of  $M$  [4]. The compositional semantics of [3] trades off the precision of these judgments with their computational complexity. We present this compositional semantics through two judgments  $(M, s) \models^p \phi$  and  $(M, s) \models^o \phi$ , which we define now formally by first fixing the syntax of the propositional modal mu-calculus  $\mathcal{MC}$  as

$$(1) \quad \phi ::= q \mid Z \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \neg \phi \mid \text{EX} \phi \mid \mu Z. \phi$$

where  $q$  ranges over a set of propositional atoms,  $Z$  ranges over a set of recursion variables,  $\mu Z. \phi$  binds occurrences of  $Z$  in its body  $\phi$ , and all free occurrences of  $Z$  in that body are under an even scope of negations. We use  $\phi \vee \psi$  as syntactic sugar for  $\neg(\neg \phi \wedge \neg \psi)$ , and use  $\rightarrow$  and  $\leftrightarrow$  as abbreviations with their usual encodings in terms of  $\neg$  and  $\vee$ . A formula  $\phi$  is a sentence if it has no free variables.

We let  $\mathcal{PML}$ , (basic) propositional modal logic, be those formulas of  $\mathcal{MC}$  that contain neither recursion variables  $Z$  nor fixed-point operators  $\mu Z$ . Propositional logic is the set  $\mathcal{PL}$  of those formulas of  $\mathcal{PML}$  that don't contain any EX operator.

For each partial Kripke structure  $M = (S, R, L)$  and each formula  $\phi \in \mathcal{MC}$  we define in Figure 2 a set  $\|\phi\|_p^m$  (for  $m \in \{o, p\}$ ) of those states in  $S$  that satisfy  $\phi$ ,

$$\begin{array}{ll}
\| q \|_\rho^o = \{s \mid L(s, q) \neq 0\} & \| q \|_\rho^p = \{s \mid L(s, q) = 1\} \\
\| Z \|_\rho^o = \rho(Z) & \| Z \|_\rho^p = \rho(Z) \\
\| \phi \wedge \psi \|_\rho^o = \| \phi \|_\rho^o \cap \| \psi \|_\rho^o & \| \phi \wedge \psi \|_\rho^p = \| \phi \|_\rho^p \cap \| \psi \|_\rho^p \\
\| \neg \phi \|_\rho^o = S \setminus \| \phi \|_\rho^o & \| \neg \phi \|_\rho^p = S \setminus \| \phi \|_\rho^p \\
\| \text{EX } \phi \|_\rho^o = \text{pre}(\| \phi \|_\rho^o) & \| \text{EX } \phi \|_\rho^p = \text{pre}(\| \phi \|_\rho^p) \\
\| \mu Z. \phi \|_\rho^o = \text{lfp } F_{\phi, \rho}^o & \| \mu Z. \phi \|_\rho^p = \text{lfp } F_{\phi, \rho}^p
\end{array}$$

Fig. 2. Compositional semantics of propositional modal mu-calculus formulas  $\phi$  over a partial Kripke structure  $M = (S, R, L)$ , where  $\text{pre}: \mathbb{P}(S) \rightarrow \mathbb{P}(S)$  is  $\text{pre}(X) = \{s \in S \mid \exists (s, s') \in R: s' \in X\}$ ,  $F_{\phi, \rho}^m: (\mathbb{P}(S), \subseteq) \rightarrow (\mathbb{P}(S), \subseteq)$  is  $F_{\phi, \rho}^m(X) = \| \phi \|_{\rho[Z \mapsto X]}^m$  for  $m \in \{o, p\}$ , and  $\text{lfp } F$  is the least fixed point of a monotone function  $F$  on the complete lattice  $(\mathbb{P}(S), \subseteq)$ .

where  $\rho$  maps each recursion variable  $Z$  to a set of states,  $\rho(Z) \subseteq S$ . For a sentence  $\phi \in \mathcal{MC}$  we define

$$(2) \quad (M, s) \models^m \phi \quad \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \quad s \in \| \phi \|_\rho^m \text{ for some } \rho$$

This is well defined as  $\| \phi \|_\rho^m$  is independent of the choice of  $\rho$  for sentence  $\phi$ . The cost of computing  $\| \phi \|_\rho^m$  is, up to a constant, essentially that of computing the standard satisfaction relation on Kripke structures [4]. So the judgments in (2) can be computed as efficiently as satisfaction for Kripke structures. We note that both  $(K, t) \models^o \phi$  and  $(K, t) \models^p \phi$  render the standard satisfaction relation [9] on pointed Kripke structures  $(K, t)$ .

The results and proofs in this paper will only apply to sentences. We therefore abuse notation to refer to  $\mathcal{MC}$ ,  $\mathcal{PML}$ , and  $\mathcal{PL}$  also as the subsets of sentences of these respective logics.

The next theorem, whose result is implicit in [3,4], connects the compositional semantics with that of generalized model checking.

**Theorem 2.6** *Let  $(M, s)$  be a pointed model and  $\phi \in \mathcal{MC}$  a sentence. Then:*

- (i)  $(M, s) \models^p \phi$  implies  $\text{VAL}(M, s, \phi)$  and
- (ii)  $\text{SAT}(M, s, \phi)$  implies  $(M, s) \models^o \phi$ .

Item (i) states that the compositional semantics is sound. We can verify the expensive  $\text{VAL}(M, s, \phi)$  by trying to establish the much cheaper  $(M, s) \models^p \phi$ . Item (ii) in that theorem may not be of direct interest in verification but is useful for the proof of the first implication. Showing  $\text{VAL}(M, s, \phi)$  through the cheaper judgment  $(M, s) \models^p \phi$  won't always succeed.

**Example 2.7** [6] Consider the formula  $\phi = \text{EX } q \wedge (\text{EX } r \vee \text{EX } \neg r)$  and any model  $M = (\{s\}, \{(s, s)\}, L)$  with  $L(s, q) = 1$  and  $L(s, r) = 1/2$ . Then  $(M, s) \not\models^p \phi$  since  $(M, s) \not\models^p \text{EX } r \vee \text{EX } \neg r$ . But all pointed Kripke structures that refine  $(M, s)$  satisfy  $\phi$ , i.e.  $\text{VAL}(M, s, \phi)$  holds.

This example illustrates the necessary tradeoff between the precision of  $\text{VAL}(M, s, \phi)$  and the lower computational cost of  $(M, s) \models^p \phi$ . In this paper we are interested in those  $\phi \in \mathcal{MC}$  for which the implications in Theorem 2.6 are

reversible for all pointed models. This leads to the concept of semantic minimization [2,15,14,6].

**Definition 2.8** [6] A sentence  $\phi \in \mathcal{MC}$  is

- (i) *pessimistically semantically self-minimizing* iff for all pointed models  $(M, s)$  we have  $(M, s) \models^p \phi \Leftrightarrow \text{VAL}(M, s, \phi)$ ,
- (ii) *optimistically semantically self-minimizing* iff for all pointed models  $(M, s)$  we have  $(M, s) \models^o \phi \Leftrightarrow \text{SAT}(M, s, \phi)$ , and
- (iii) *semantically self-minimizing* iff it is optimistically and pessimistically self-minimizing.

Given these three concepts, we write PSM, OSM, and  $\text{PSM} \cap \text{OSM}$  for the sets of sentences of  $\mathcal{MC}$  that satisfy the respective concept in items (i), (ii), and (iii).

**Example 2.9** • The formula  $q \vee \neg q$  is optimistically self-minimizing but not pessimistically so – consider the case when  $L(s, q) = 1/2$ .

- The pattern “*Precedence Chain: 2 stimuli, 1 response; Globally q and s precede r*” [5], as documented at [patterns.projects.cis.ksu.edu](http://patterns.projects.cis.ksu.edu), written in  $\mathcal{MC}$  as

$$\neg E[\neg q U r] \wedge E[\neg r U (q \wedge \neg r \wedge EX(E[\neg s U (r \wedge \neg s)]))]$$

is pessimistically self-minimizing [1].

- The pattern “*Absence of q, Before r*”, written in  $\mathcal{MC}$  as

$$\phi = A[\neg q \vee AG(\neg r)W r]$$

is not pessimistically self-minimizing but

$$\phi^p = A[\neg q \vee AX(AG(\neg r)W r)]$$

is, and is logically equivalent to  $\phi$  over Kripke structures [1].

### 3 Decision Problems

We write VAL for the valid sentences of  $\mathcal{MC}$  and, dually, UNSAT for the unsatisfiable sentences of  $\mathcal{MC}$ . The set  $\mathcal{MC}$  is partitioned into VAL, UNSAT, and  $\mathcal{MC} - (\text{VAL} \cup \text{UNSAT})$ . If we refine this partition with the sets PSM and OSM under union, intersection, and complement we arrive at six equivalence classes. Throughout, it will be clear from the context whether these sets are meant to be subsets of  $\mathcal{MC}$ ,  $\mathcal{PML}$  or  $\mathcal{PL}$ .

**Proposition 3.1** (i) VAL is contained in OSM and disjoint from PSM. Dually, UNSAT is contained in PSM and disjoint from OSM.

- (ii) For each  $\mathcal{L} \in \{\mathcal{MC}, \mathcal{PML}, \mathcal{PL}\}$ , set  $\mathcal{L}$  is partitioned into the six sets

**I** VAL

**II** UNSAT

**III**  $\text{OSM} \setminus (\text{VAL} \cup \text{PSM})$

**IV**  $\text{PSM} \setminus (\text{UNSAT} \cup \text{OSM})$

**V**  $\mathcal{L} \setminus (\text{PSM} \cup \text{OSM})$

**VI**  $\text{PSM} \cap \text{OSM}$

as illustrated in Figure 3.




Fig. 3. A partition of  $\mathcal{MC}$ ,  $\mathcal{PML}$ , and  $\mathcal{PL}$  into six equivalence classes, generated by boolean combinations of VAL and PSM.

### Proof (Sketch)

- (i) <sup>4</sup> Consider the partial Kripke structure  $M_{\perp} = (\{s_{\perp}\}, \{(s_{\perp}, s_{\perp})\}, L_{\perp})$  where  $L_{\perp}(s_{\perp}, q) = 1/2$  for all  $q \in \mathbb{AP}$ . Then every pointed Kripke structure (over  $\mathbb{AP}$ ) is a refinement of  $(M_{\perp}, s_{\perp})$ . One shows that for all sentences  $\phi \in \mathcal{MC}$  we have

$$(3) \quad (M_{\perp}, s_{\perp}) \models^o \phi \quad \text{and} \quad (M_{\perp}, s_{\perp}) \not\models^p \phi$$

The first statement in (3) is used to prove that UNSAT and OSM are disjoint. The second statement in (3) implies that VAL is disjoint from PSM.

To see that  $\text{VAL} \subseteq \text{OSM}$ , let  $\phi$  be valid and  $(M, s)$  a pointed model. We have that  $\text{SAT}(M, s, \phi)$  holds since there are refining pointed Kripke structures of  $(M, s)$  and  $\phi$  is valid. But then  $(M, s) \models^o \phi$  holds by Theorem 2.6. Since  $(M, s)$  was arbitrary,  $\phi \in \text{OSM}$  follows.

The dual statement, that UNSAT is contained in PSM, is proved in the dual fashion.

- (ii) From the first item it follows that VAL, PSM, and OSM alone generate only the six sets **I** - **VI** by repeated applications of union, intersection, and complement; and that these six sets are mutually disjoint. We list sentences that show all six sets are inhabited:  $q \vee \neg q \in \text{VAL}$ ,  $q \wedge \neg q \in \text{UNSAT}$ ,  $(q \vee \neg q) \wedge r \in \text{OSM} \setminus (\text{VAL} \cup \text{PSM})$ ,  $(q \wedge \neg q) \vee r \in \text{PSM} \setminus (\text{UNSAT} \cup \text{OSM})$ ,  $[q \wedge (r \vee \neg r)] \vee [\neg q \wedge (r \wedge \neg r)] \in \mathcal{MC} \setminus (\text{PSM} \cup \text{OSM})$ , and  $q \in \text{PSM} \cap \text{OSM}$ . Since these sentences are in  $\mathcal{PL}$ , we thus have a partition for all three cases of  $\mathcal{L} \in \{\mathcal{MC}, \mathcal{PML}, \mathcal{PL}\}$ . □

For each of these six sets we now study the complexity of deciding membership of that set. We first observe how negation acts on these sets.

<sup>4</sup> This would not hold, as stated, in the presence of constants for *true* and *false* in  $\mathcal{MC}$ . But their absence from  $\mathcal{MC}$  merely simplifies the presentation of our results.

**Lemma 3.2** *Negation  $\phi \mapsto \neg\phi$  maps the following pairs of sets into each other: OSM and PSM, **I** and **II**, **III** and **IV**, **V** and itself, and **VI** and itself.*

**Proof (Sketch)** A sentence is in VAL iff its negation is in UNSAT, and it is in OSM iff its negation is in PSM. Therefore a sentence is in set **I** iff its negation is in set **II**, and it is in  $\text{OSM} \setminus (\text{VAL} \cup \text{PSM})$  iff its negation is in  $\text{PSM} \setminus (\text{UNSAT} \cup \text{OSM})$ . This shows the claim for **I** and **II**, and for **III** and **IV**. Sets **V** and **VI** are closed under negation, since  $\phi \mapsto \neg\phi$  maps set OSM into PSM, and vice versa.  $\square$

### 3.1 Set **I**.

Deciding membership of sets **I** and **II** has, of course, the same complexity as that of the validity of the underlying logic – EXPTIME-complete for  $\mathcal{MC}$ , PSPACE-complete for  $\mathcal{PML}$ , and coNP-complete for  $\mathcal{PL}$ .

### 3.2 Set OSM.

By Lemma 3.2 we have  $\phi \in \text{OSM} \Leftrightarrow \neg\phi \in \text{PSM}$ . Thus the complexity of deciding OSM is the same as that of deciding PSM. But deciding OSM is at least as hard as deciding validity of the underlying logic. This can be seen by considering the function

$$(4) \quad E(\phi) = \phi \vee (x \wedge \neg x)$$

where  $x$  is a new propositional atom in  $\mathbb{AP}$ , and so not contained in  $\phi$ . If  $\phi$  is valid, then so is  $E(\phi)$ , and this implies that  $E(\phi)$  is in OSM. If  $\phi$  is not valid, then there is a pointed Kripke structure  $(K, t)$  in which  $\phi$  is false. We extend the labeling function  $L$  of  $K$  so that  $L(s, x) = 1/2$  for all states  $s$  of  $K$  – making  $K$  into a partial Kripke structure. Then  $(K, t) \models^o E(\phi)$  follows for this extended  $K$  but there is no refinement of  $(K, t)$  that satisfies  $E(\phi)$  as this formula is semantically equivalent to  $\phi$  over Kripke structures. Thus,  $\phi$  is valid iff  $E(\phi)$  is in OSM and so we can reduce validity checks to checks of membership of OSM.

To summarize, deciding OSM is EXPTIME-hard, PSPACE-hard, and coNP-hard for  $\mathcal{MC}$ ,  $\mathcal{PML}$ , and  $\mathcal{PL}$  respectively.

### $\mathcal{MC}$ .

We can decide in 2EXPTIME whether a sentence  $\phi \in \mathcal{MC}$  is in OSM. This is implicit in [6], where from  $\phi$  two alternating tree automata are being constructed – with exponential blowup in the worst case – and membership of  $\phi$  in OSM is then being reduced to a language inclusion check for these automata, again, in EXPTIME but now in the size of these automata.

### $\mathcal{PML}$ .

Consider a sentence  $\phi \in \mathcal{PML}$ . As just said for  $\mathcal{MC}$ , in [6], two tree automata  $A_\phi^3$  and  $A_{\models^o \phi}^3$  were constructed such that  $\phi$  is optimistically self-minimizing iff  $\mathcal{L}(A_{\models^o \phi}^3) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A_\phi^3)$ . Since  $\mathcal{PML} \subseteq \mathcal{MC}$ , such a language inclusion check is in EXPTIME in the size of these automata. However, since both automata cannot distinguish trees at depths greater than the size of  $\phi$ , reflecting the shallow model

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boolean NotInOSM(phi) {
  **choose** model M such that M(x) = 1/2 for some x in AP(phi);
  if (M |=o phi) {
    for (all x in AP(phi) with M(x) = 1/2) {
      if (!(M[x --> 0] |=o phi) && !(M[x --> 1] |=o phi)) {
        ACCEPT;
      }
    }
  }
  REJECT;
}

```

Fig. 4. NP algorithm that decides membership of  $\mathcal{P}\mathcal{L} \setminus \text{OSM}$ . If at least one choice of model leads to **ACCEPT**, the algorithm returns *true*; otherwise it returns *false*.

property of  $\mathcal{P}\mathcal{M}\mathcal{L}$ , such a language inclusion check can be performed already in PSPACE. Since the underlying automata has size at most exponential in the size of  $\phi$  we conclude that the language inclusion check can be done in EXPSpace in the size of  $\phi$ .

$\mathcal{P}\mathcal{L}$ .

We now show that, for  $\mathcal{P}\mathcal{L}$ , deciding membership of OSM is in coNP, and so the above hardness result is indeed exact. Let  $\mathbb{A}\mathbb{P}(\phi)$  be the set of atomic propositions that occur in  $\phi$ . The evaluation of  $(M, s) \models^o \phi$  for  $\phi \in \mathcal{P}\mathcal{L}$  depends only on the values  $\{L_M(s, q) \mid \mathbb{A}\mathbb{P}(\phi)\}$ . Therefore, we can think of the pointed model  $(M, s)$  as a function from atomic propositions to values in  $\{0, 1/2, 1\}$  and so we will write  $M(q)$  etc. below with that interpretation. We write  $M[q \mapsto v]$  for the model that is as  $M$ , except that it maps  $q$  to value  $v \in \{0, 1\}$ . We will also use that  $M \models^o \phi$  will only depend on the behavior of  $M$  on set  $\mathbb{A}\mathbb{P}(\phi)$ .

If there are  $k > 0$  atomic propositions in  $\phi \in \mathcal{P}\mathcal{L}$ , we have just seen that we can decide semantic self-minimization of  $\phi$  by inspecting, for  $3^k$  models, whether the compositional model-checking algorithm loses any precision. This observation leads to a non-deterministic algorithm, depicted in Figure 4, for showing that  $\mathcal{P}\mathcal{L} \setminus \text{OSM}$  is in NP, and so OSM is in coNP.

**Proposition 3.3** *The NP algorithm in Figure 4 correctly decides membership of  $\mathcal{P}\mathcal{L} \setminus \text{OSM}$ .*

**Proof (Sketch)**

- Let  $\phi \in \mathcal{P}\mathcal{L}$  be such that the algorithm accepts it. Then there is some model  $M$  and some  $x \in \mathbb{A}\mathbb{P}(\phi)$  such that
  - $M(x) = 1/2$ ,
  - $M \models^o \phi$ , and
  - $M[x \mapsto v] \not\models^o \phi$  for all  $v \in \{0, 1\}$ .

The last item and Theorem 2.6 imply that  $\text{SAT}(M[x \mapsto v], \cdot, \phi)$  is false for both  $v = 0, 1$ . Then it must also be that  $\text{SAT}(M, \cdot, \phi)$  is false. But then the second item implies that  $\phi$  is not in OSM.

- Conversely, let  $\phi \notin \text{OSM}$ . Then, by Theorem 2.6, there is a model  $M$  such that

$$(5) \quad M \models^o \phi \text{ holds and } \text{SAT}(M, \cdot, \phi) \text{ does not hold}$$

This can only be if there is some  $x \in \mathbb{AP}(\phi)$  with  $M(x) = 1/2$ . Let  $M$  be a model satisfying (5) but where the set

$$\{x \in \mathbb{AP}(\phi) \mid M(x) = 1/2\}$$

is minimal amongst all models satisfying (5). Since there is some  $x$  with  $M(x) = 1/2$ , the algorithm will encounter the first if-statement and its guard will be true. Therefore, its for-statement will be executed and, for the first (indeed all)  $x$  it executes we can now reason that the algorithm will accept.

Since  $\text{SAT}(M, \cdot, \phi)$  is false, we know that  $\text{SAT}(M[x \mapsto v], \cdot, \phi)$  is false for all  $v \in \{0, 1\}$ . By the minimality of model  $M$  with respect to (5), we infer that  $M[x \mapsto v] \models^o \phi$  has to be false for  $v = 0$  and for  $v = 1$ . Thus the algorithm reaches ACCEPT.

□

### 3.3 Set **III**.

Deciding set **III** is at least as hard as deciding OSM, and therefore at least as hard as deciding validity of the underlying logic. To see this, consider the function

$$(6) \quad F(\phi) = (\phi \vee x) \wedge (y \wedge (z \vee \neg z))$$

where  $x, y,$  and  $z$  are new elements of  $\mathbb{AP}$  and so not contained in  $\phi$ . The reduction is shown through the composition  $F \circ E$  if

$$(7) \quad F(\phi) \in \mathbf{III} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \phi \in \text{OSM}$$

holds. We show (7):

- For no  $\phi$  is  $F(\phi)$  in PSM: consider a pointed model  $(M, s)$  with  $L(s, x) = L(s, y) = 1$  and  $L(s, z) = 1/2$ . Then  $(M, s) \not\models^p F(\phi)$  holds but all pointed Kripke structures that refine  $(M, s)$  satisfy  $\phi$ .
- For no  $\phi$  is  $F(\phi)$  in VAL since there are, e.g., pointed models  $(M, s)$  for which  $L(s, y) = 0$ .

So  $F(\phi)$  is in set **III** iff  $F(\phi)$  is in  $\text{OSM} \setminus \text{VAL}$  iff  $F(\phi)$  is in OSM. Thus it suffices to show  $F(\phi) \in \text{OSM} \Leftrightarrow \phi \in \text{OSM}$ . In doing so, we appeal to the fact that  $\phi, \psi \in \text{OSM}$  imply that  $\phi \wedge \psi \in \text{OSM}$  whenever  $\phi$  and  $\psi$  share no atomic propositions, and that OSM is closed under disjunctions [6].

- Let  $\phi \in \text{OSM}$ . Since  $y$  and  $z \vee \neg z \in \text{OSM}$  we get  $y \wedge (z \vee \neg z) \in \text{OSM}$  as both conjuncts share no atomic propositions. Since  $\phi, x \in \text{OSM}$ , their disjunction  $\phi \vee x$  is in OSM as well. Since  $\phi \wedge x$  and  $y \wedge (z \vee \neg z)$  share no atomic proposition and both are in OSM, we get  $F(\phi) \in \text{OSM}$ .
- Let  $\phi \notin \text{OSM}$ . Then there is a pointed model  $(M, s)$  such that  $(M, s) \models^o \phi$  and  $\text{SAT}(M, s, \phi)$  is false. Extend the labeling function  $L_M$  of  $(M, s)$  such that  $L_M(s, y) = L_M(s, z) = 1$  and  $L_M(s, x) = 0$ . Then  $(M, s) \models^o F(\phi)$  holds for this extension but  $\text{SAT}(M, s, F(\phi))$  is false, since  $\text{SAT}(M, s, \phi)$  is false and all pointed Kripke structures  $(K, t)$  that refine the extended  $(M, s)$  must satisfy  $L_K(t, x) = 0$  and  $L_K(t, y) = 1$ . So  $F(\phi) \notin \text{OSM}$ .

Combining (7) with the reduction of OSM to validity checks, we infer that deciding set **III** is EXPTIME-hard, PSPACE-hard, and coNP-hard for  $\mathcal{MC}$ ,  $\mathcal{PML}$  and  $\mathcal{PL}$  (respectively).

$\mathcal{MC}$ .

We can decide PSM and OSM in 2EXPTIME, and decide VAL in EXPTIME. So we can decide set **III** in 2EXPTIME.

$\mathcal{PML}$ .

We already have seen that OSM can be decided in EXPSPACE, so this applies to PSM as well. Since VAL can be decided in PSPACE we can decide set **III** also in EXPSPACE.

$\mathcal{PL}$ .

We have shown that OSM is in coNP. By Lemma 3.2 this implies that PSM is in coNP as well. Since VAL is in coNP, the language  $\mathcal{PL} \setminus (\text{VAL} \cup \text{PSM})$  is in NP. Set **III** equals  $\text{OSM} \cap (\mathcal{PL} \setminus (\text{VAL} \cup \text{PSM}))$  and so is in DP [12,13] as the intersection of a language in coNP with one in NP. We are presently unable to show DP-hardness of set **III**, despite having made a considerable effort to that end.

### 3.4 Set **V**.

Sentences in set **V** lose precision in the pessimistic and in the optimistic compositional semantics. Since unsatisfiable sentences are in PSM, sentences in set **V** must be satisfiable. Deciding membership of set **V** is also at least as hard as the satisfiability check of the relevant logic. To see this, consider

$$(8) \quad G(\phi) = (\phi \wedge (x \vee \neg x) \wedge y) \vee (z \wedge \neg z)$$

where  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $z$  are in  $\mathbb{AP}$  and again not appearing in  $\phi$ .

- For no  $\phi$  is  $G(\phi)$  in OSM, and so  $G(\phi)$  is in set **V** iff  $G(\phi)$  is not in PSM: consider a pointed model  $(M, s)$  with  $L_M(s, z) = 1/2$  and  $L_M(s, y) = 0$ . Then  $(M, s) \models^o G(\phi)$  holds but no pointed Kripke structure that refines  $(M, s)$  satisfies  $\phi$ .
- Now if  $\phi$  is unsatisfiable, then  $G(\phi)$  is also unsatisfiable, so  $G(\phi)$  will be in PSM. Conversely, if  $\phi$  is satisfiable (on some pointed Kripke structure  $(K, t)$ ) we claim that  $G(\phi)$  is not in PSM. To see this we make  $K$  into a partial Kripke structure by extending its labeling function  $L$  with  $L(t, x) = L(t, y) = 1$  and  $L(t, z) = 1/2$ . Then all pointed Kripke structures that refine this expanded  $(K, t)$  satisfy  $\phi$ , yet  $(K, t) \not\models^p G(\phi)$ .

The combination of these two items shows

$$(9) \quad \phi \text{ satisfiable} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad G(\phi) \in \mathbf{V}$$

To summarize, deciding set **V** is EXPTIME-hard, PSPACE-hard, and NP-hard for  $\mathcal{MC}$ ,  $\mathcal{PML}$ , and  $\mathcal{PL}$  (respectively).

*MC.*

It is easily seen that deciding set **V** is in 2EXPTIME as that complexity class is closed under finite unions and complements.

*PM $\mathcal{L}$ .*

We can decide membership of set **V** by two checks, one for OSM and one for PSM – both were shown to be in EXPSPACE. We therefore conclude that set **V** can be decided in EXPSPACE as well.

*PL.*

Since OSM and PSM are in coNP so is their union. But then set **V** is in NP as the complement of a language in coNP. Since we already showed that set **V** is NP-hard, we get that set **V** is NP-complete.

### 3.5 Set **VI**.

Sentences in **VI** are well behaved in that they lose precision neither for the pessimistic nor the optimistic compositional semantics. So satisfiability and validity checks for *all* partial state spaces are reducible to a single, simple verification for such sentences. The exact complexity of deciding this set remains to be frustratingly unknown. Of course, deciding set **VI** is no harder than deciding two instances of OSM:

$$(\phi \in \text{PSM} \cap \text{OSM}) \Leftrightarrow (\phi \in \text{OSM} \ \& \ \neg\phi \in \text{OSM})$$

So deciding set **VI** is no harder than deciding validity of the respective logic. Alas, we are unable to produce any hardness results for this class for any of the logics considered.

*MC.*

Since OSM and PSM are in 2EXPTIME and the latter is closed under finite intersections, set **VI** is in 2EXPTIME.

*PM $\mathcal{L}$ .*

We argue as for set **V** to see that deciding set **VI** is in EXPSPACE.

*PL.*

Since OSM and PSM are in coNP and coNP is closed under finite intersections, set **VI** is in coNP.

### 3.6 Experimental data

With the decision problems at hand, experimental data are probably not obtainable with ease. Still, we wanted to get a feel for how many formulas of a given size are in OSM and in the sets **V** and **VI**. We used Perl scripts to randomly generate “all” formulas of *PL* in sizes ranging from 1 to 5 where “size” is the number of occurrences of logical connectives in the formula. These scripts then performed a

brute-force check for membership of sets of interest. This showed that about 75% of those formulas are in OSM and about the same percentage are in PSM, whereas about 50% of formulas were in  $\text{PSM} \cap \text{OSM}$ . Of the formulas generated, only about 2.45% were in the NP-complete set  $\mathcal{PL} \setminus (\text{PSM} \cup \text{OSM})$ . Our results indicate that less formulas are in the latter set as the number of occurrences of logical operators in these formulas increases.

### 3.7 Summary of results

The complexity results shown in this paper are summarized in Figure 5. These results illustrate that we cannot issue any exact complexity bounds, as those for validity and unsatisfiability are well known. Our hardness results either exhibit an exponential gap for upper bounds (for  $\mathcal{MC}$  and  $\mathcal{PML}$ ) or a believed gap in the boolean hierarchy over NP (for  $\mathcal{PL}$ ). One can also see that semantic self-minimization, the question of whether a formula and its negation are in PSM, lacks any hardness results at present.

## 4 Related work

The partial models, their refinement notion, and the compositional semantics for partial models presented in this paper were introduced (for CTL, a fragment of  $\mathcal{MC}$ ) in [3]. Generalized model checking, its complexity analysis, and a model-checking algorithm for it were then presented in [4] for linear-time and branching-time temporal logics. Partial models, their refinement, and temporal logic semantics were already developed for labelled transition systems in [11]. Partial versions of models that have labels on transitions as well as on states were discussed in [7]. The notion of semantic minimization, as presented in this paper, was proposed and shown to exist for propositional logic, propositional modal logic, and the propositional modal mu-calculus in [6]. The demonstration that practically relevant temporal logic specifications are by and large pessimistically self-minimizing was given in [1].

Blamey [2] studied partial-valued logics and their applications to linguistics and model theory and proved the existence of semantic minimizations (in our terminology) for propositional logic. The notion of supervaluational meaning was defined and studied by van Fraassen [15]; it is the definitional template for the generalized model checking judgements for temporal logics in this paper. Reps et al. [14] use BDD-based prime-implicant algorithms for a more efficient implementation of the computation of semantic minimizations in propositional logic.

## 5 Conclusions

We presented two notions of satisfaction for partial state spaces – a precise but expensive one, and a cheap but imprecise one. We then asked how complex it is to decide whether a given property yields the same satisfaction result, for all partial state spaces, in both notions. We showed that this problem is connected to the validity problem of the respective temporal logic but that the actual picture is more complex. For the propositional modal mu-calculus and propositional modal logic we showed that deciding optimistic and pessimistic self-minimization is at least

Results for  $\mathcal{MC}$ :

2EXPTIME, EXPTIME-hard	EXPTIME-complete	2EXPTIME
OSM	VAL	PSM $\cap$ OSM
PSM	UNSAT	
OSM $\setminus$ (VAL $\cup$ PSM)		
PSM $\setminus$ (UNSAT $\cup$ OSM)		
$\mathcal{MC} \setminus$ (PSM $\cup$ OSM)		

Results for  $\mathcal{PML}$ :

EXPSPACE, PSPACE-hard	PSPACE-complete	EXPSPACE
OSM	VAL	PSM $\cap$ OSM
PSM	UNSAT	
OSM $\setminus$ (VAL $\cup$ PSM)		
PSM $\setminus$ (UNSAT $\cup$ OSM)		
$\mathcal{PML} \setminus$ (PSM $\cup$ OSM)		

Results for  $\mathcal{PL}$ :

DP, coNP-hard	NP-complete	coNP-complete	coNP
OSM $\setminus$ (VAL $\cup$ PSM)	$\mathcal{PL} \setminus$ (PSM $\cup$ OSM)	VAL	PSM $\cap$ OSM
PSM $\setminus$ (UNSAT $\cup$ OSM)		UNSAT	
		OSM	
		PSM	

Fig. 5. Complexity results for PSM, OSM, and for the partition induced by VAL and PSM; the three tables present these results for  $\mathcal{MC}$ ,  $\mathcal{PML}$ , and  $\mathcal{PL}$  (respectively).

as hard as the respective validity problems, but that we can show membership of this decision problem only for a complexity class exponentially higher than that. For self-minimization as such, we could not show a hardness result for any logic considered. For propositional logic we could show that optimistic and pessimistic semantic self-minimization both match the complexity of validity and that the set of formulas that are neither optimistically nor pessimistically self-minimizing matches the complexity of satisfiability. We also discovered that two sets, for which we had exponential gaps for the propositional modal mu-calculus and for propositional modal logic, are coNP-hard sets in DP in the case of propositional logic.

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