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Sufficiently Secure Peer-to-Peer Networks

Rupert Gatti, Stephen Lewis, Andy Ozment, Thierry Rayna, Andrey Serjantov

Conference or Workshop Paper
Third Workshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS)
May, 2004
Workshop on Economics and Information Security

Threat models in computer security often consider a very powerful adversary. A more useful model may be to consider conflict in which both sides have economic considerations that limit the resources they are willing to devote to the conflict. This paper examines censorship resistance in a peer-to-peer network. A simple game theoretic model is examined and then elaborated to include multiple publishers, non-linear cost functions, and non-trivial search heuristics. In each elaboration, we examine the equilibrium behaviour of the censor and the publisher.

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